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COMMENTS

a very absurd and disastrous public policy... ."18 The second view would
be acceptable if the only question propounded was whether or not the
confession was trustworthy. Hence, the best way to secure fair treatment
for the accused and to deter the zeal of the police in extorting confessions,
is to deny to the latter the fruits of their illegal acts. The court in Wilson
v. State declared:
While the character of the confession is ordinarily shown by answers to appropriate questions, the court should look beyond these to the condition, situation, and character of the accused and the circumstances surrounding him. 19

Therefore, it would seem the third view is the most just.
On the other hand, it may be doubted that the rules of evidence ought
be used as a potential threat to the police to force them to go about their
job properly. One may share the conviction of Wigmore, that the fewer
obstacles there are in the way of admitting the confession, the greater is
the justice attained in the end.
CONCLUSION

In the last analysis, whether or not involuntary confessions, which the
police illegally obtain, ought to be admitted depends upon the community
involved. A very important factor is the respect for the law that is found
in the law-enforcement agencies of the community, and the relating rarity
of their deliberate departure from ordinary standards of justice. The existence of a large criminal class and a high crime rate also may be other
important factors in determining the social need of the community that
should determine its laws.
It is doubtful if any part of the confession ought to be admissible, even
though confirmed by the discovery of evidence made in consequence of
the confession because the reasons for excluding improper confessions are
complex and not based solely on a presumed untrustworthiness.
18

Rusher v. State, 94 Ga. 363, 21 S.E. 593, 594 (1894).

19 84

Ala. 426, 428; 4 So. 383, 384 (1888).

FEDERAL JURISDICTION UNDER THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE AND INTRASTATE EXTORTION
What is the status of the law as to federal jurisdiction over cases wherein an intrastate telephone message was used for the purpose of extortion
or the perpetration of fraud? The bases upon which federal jurisdiction
is sought are the extortion by interstate communications' and the fraud
by wire2 sections of the Federal Criminal Code.
The abovementioned code provisions will be referred to as the extor1 18 U.S.C.A. 875.

2. 18

U.S.C.A. 1343.
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tion statute and the fraud by wire statute. A third statutory provision involved in this discussion, Section 605 of the Communications Act, will be
3
termed the wire-tapping statute.
All of this codification came into being by virtue of the power given to
Congress, by the constitution, to regulate commerce. 4 For example, the
wire-tapping statute was incorporated into the Communications Act of
1934, and the fraud by wire provision was part of an amendment to the
same Act; 5 and "the declared purpose of the Communications Act was to
regulate interstate and foreign commerce. . .. "I'
The protection of commerce from illegal outside forces is the ultimate
objective of Congress in this area, or, as was stated in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., ".... to insure its safety; to
foster, protect, control, and restrain. ' '7 The Congressional objective in regard to the wire-tapping statute, for example, may be illustrated by citing
a case wherein the court declared that the protection was intended to extend to the means of communication and not the secrecy of the conversation."
It has been held that the privacy sought to be protected by the statute
is the privacy of the conduit or instrumentality used in interstate commerce, regardless of the fact that the same physical equipment is used for
intrastate communication.9
It may therefore be seen that, according to judicial interpretation, wiretapping legislation was passed as a means of protecting the telephone system. Further, it can probably be assumed, though the assumption is unsupported by judicial authority, that the extortion and fraud by wire
statutes were passed in order to protect the communications system from
use for the illegal purposes enumerated in the statutes.
In Weiss v. United States,10 the Supreme Court of the United States
heard a controversy involving the extension of federal jurisdiction under
the wire-tapping statute. It was there concluded that the provision would
apply to intrastate as well as interstate communications. The court here
reaffirmed the theory:
Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately considered, if they have such close and substantial relation to interstate commerce
3 47 U.S.C.A. 605.

U.S. Constitution Art. 1, Section 8.
5 Rose v. United States, 227 F. 2d 448
4

(C.A. 10th, 1955).
6 Diamond v. United States, 108 F. 2d 859, 860 (C.A. 6th, 1938).
7 301 U.S. 1, 36 (1937). Court's citations omitted.
8

United States v. Sugden, 226 F. 2d 281 (C.A. 9th, 1942).

9 Authority cited note 5 supra.
10 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
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that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from
burdens or obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that
control.'"
The rationale in the Weiss case was, essentially, that since the wires
used to transmit the intrastate message in question were used to transmit
interstate messages also, there was a relationship with interstate commerce,
and Congress had the power to act in this situation. The court also noted,
however, that the applicable clause of the wire-tapping statute contained
the words "any communication," as opposed to "interstate and foreign communications," as found in other clauses of the same statute. It was observed
that the substitution of the former for the latter phraseology was an illustration of the Congressional intent to regulate intrastate communications
under this statute.
The language in the extortion statute is "in interstate commerce any
communication"; 12 and the fraud by wire statute reads, "communication
in interstate or foreign commerce."' 3 The language of all three statutes is
quite similar. Therefore, federal jurisdiction could be granted in the extortion and fraud by wire cases by giving the above-mentioned wording
14
as broad a judicial interpretation as it was afforded in the Weiss case.
Another basis for including intrastate activities under such legislation is
indicated in Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co.,
where it was said:
The inquiry whether the restraint occurs in one place or another, interstate
or intrastate, of the total economic process is now a preliminary step, except
in those situations in which no aspect of or substantial effect upon interstate
commerce can be found in the sum of the facts presented. For, given a restraint
of the type forbidden by the act, though arising in the course of intrastate or
local activities, and a showing of actual or threatened effect upon interstate
commerce, the vital question becomes whether the effect is sufficiently subpolicy declared in the Acts' terms
stantial and adverse to Congress' paramount
15
to constitute a forbidden consequence.
The foregoing is applicable to the extortion and fraud by wire provisions
if it can first be concluded that: (1) the intrastate phone calls affect the
telephone system which Congress is attempting to protect, and (2) the
effect is substantially adverse to the policy of the statutes.
Numerous reasons have been assigned for the probable extension of
federal jurisdiction into the legislative area herein discussed. A qualification is now in order. In the Weiss case, which forms the foundation for
the arguments for jurisdictional extension, there was no indictment for
11 Nat'l Labor Relations Board v. Jones &Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
18 U.S.C.A. 875.
18 18 U.S.C.A. 1343.
12

24

308 US. 321 (1939).

15 334 U.S.219, 234 (1948).
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intrastate violation. In other words, the wire-tapping statute was used only
as a rule for the admissibility of evidence (or the exclusion of it). Therefore, it is altogether possible that the same court, faced with a case in
which there is an indictment, will hesitate to extend federal jurisdiction,
not wishing to be quite so liberal where the penal aspect of the statute is
sought to be extended.
A final question for consideration is that of whether a grant of federal
jurisdiction in this area constitutes an interference with the exercise of
state police powers. This situation is apparently covered by the Hobbs
Act, which provides that the federal government has jurisdiction over
such state crimes as extortion where interstate commerce is affected. This
act has been held constitutional in a recent case, 6 so the only difficulty
to be encountered is that of qualifying to come under the Act by showing
an effect on interstate commerce.
The only safe conclusion to be drawn in this area, is that whether there
will be an extension of federal jurisdiction to the cases coming under the
extortion and fraud by wire statutes, will probably depend upon the judicial interpretation of the existing case law and statutory language. At
this time, the Weiss case must be looked to as the strongest basis for seeking
federal jurisdiction in the extortion and fraud by wire cases. It may best
be expressed by quoting the court in that case when they said:
As Congress has power, when necessary for the protection of interstate
commerce, to regulate intrastate transactions, there is no constitutional re-

the scope of the statute be limited so as to exclude intrastate
quirement that
17
transactions.

16 United States v. Green, 350 U.S. 415 (1956).
17 Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321, 327 (1939).

